BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY: Magistrates’ views on the Domestic  Violence Act by Artz, Lillian
The Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998(DVA) was promulgated in an attempt toprovide victims with an accessible legal tool
to stop domestic abuse. Though far-reaching in its
definition of what constitutes an act of ‘domestic
violence’ and ‘domestic relationships’,
implementation has been slowed by considerable
teething problems. Notwithstanding its inconsistent
application by the courts, the intention of the Act
has been marred by the everyday constraints facing
courts as well as the limitations of what the Act
itself, and its agents, can reasonably provide victims
of domestic violence. 
The study on which this article is based2 finds that
magistrates interpret and apply the DVA differently.
This is not necessarily a problem given the
unlimited range of abuses committed in domestic
relationships and the remedies available under the
Act. What is striking, however, is the difference of
approaches by magistrates to the basic procedural
aspects of implementing the Act and the extent to
which this has measurable implications on the
effectiveness of the protection orders granted. 
Issues relating to evictions or removal of
respondents, emergency monetary relief, contact
orders with children, the role of alcohol and drugs,
withdrawal of applications and charges, emotional
and psychological abuse, breaches of protection
orders and the adjudication of cases where existing
High Court orders are in place, are areas of great
debate and contention among magistrates. The
discussion in this article will however be limited to
the broader debates about implementation of the
Act by magistrates.
Overall opinions of the Act
Magistrates were generally of the opinion that the
Domestic Violence Act is a progressive and useful
piece of legislation. The substantive law was
evaluated as “very good” although minor revisions
were suggested to include sectors such as health,
welfare and correctional services in the Act in order
to ensure that service provision in domestic
violence cases does not solely rest with the police
and the courts. Recognising that domestic violence
is a major social issue, with potentially serious
outcomes for victims and their families, the
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exclusion of these sectors was seen as a major
shortcoming of the DVA.
Interestingly, the inclusion of positive legal duties
on the police was considered necessary, and some
magistrates even suggested that these should be
extended to other sectors as well. It was argued that
independent monitoring systems within the criminal
justice system were not sufficient to ensure
performance. It was noted that the performance of
the police in domestic violence cases had improved
dramatically since the inception of the DVA and
that the fear of being charged with dereliction of
duty was a great incentive to this end.
Procedurally, the DVA was seen as cumbersome.
With cramped courts, heavy caseloads and the fact
that magistrates don’t focus primarily on domestic
violence cases, the application process was
considered “sloppy”. As expected, magistrates
expressed a great deal of frustration about the lack
of specifically allocated resources to implement the
Act in the way that the legislature intended. Over-
stretched courts and personnel, insufficient office
supplies and office space, lack of
telecommunications, meagre court budgets and
other basic infrastructural needs compounded an
already over-burdened system. 
Heavy caseloads mean that clerks of the court are
necessarily hasty in filling out forms and in
instructing applicants about procedures,
documentation that needs submitting to the courts,
and safety measures to protect themselves from
further violence. It was consistently argued that the
files containing the application forms were
“sketchy” at best and could be one reason for the
apparently “conservative decisions” made by
magistrates in domestic violence cases. Magistrates
re-iterated that the dearth of information contained
in the court papers was not necessarily due to a
lack of effort or competence, but rather a lack of
consultation time with applicants.
Despite the confidence expressed in the potential of
the DVA and their relative effectiveness in
implementing the Act, more sober reflections
revealed that magistrates do not feel entirely
confident that they are ‘doing the right thing’.
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Training on the social context of domestic violence
and the specific elements of the Act was seen as an
important step in improving judicial approaches to
the DVA. Working groups and workshops were
considered “essential” to the development of
magistrates who preside over these cases. The
opportunity to be presented with current research
and case studies as well as hearing how other
magistrates deal with the ‘grey’ issues of domestic
violence was cited as critical to improving how
magistrates implement the Act. After four years of
working with the Domestic Violence Act, a
magistrate had this to say about training:
What can I say about training? I was trained
second-hand – by a colleague who went to
Justice College to be trained specifically on
the Act. After presiding over domestic
violence cases for a few years, I have
realised that the Act is open to wide
interpretation and that I fundamentally
disagree with my colleague’s approach to
this Act. I can confidently state that whatever
training took place was given to the wrong
people and that whoever did the training has
never presided over a domestic violence
case before or has done little to understand
the ins-and-outs of the Act. 
Applications for a protection order
Domestic violence caseloads vary considerably
across magisterial jurisdictions with some
magistrates reporting reviewing 40 applications a
day, and others only about ten. This obviously has
serious implications for how the cases are treated.
One magistrate incisively explained the impact of
the high number of applications on his court:
When you find yourself sitting with 30-40
applications a day, you begin to feel like
your court has turned into an assembly line.
The cases all begin to look the same and the
time that you would like to spend…going
through each application thoroughly… is
terribly diminished. You begin to question
the effectiveness of the system and the
accuracy of your own judgment. You ask
yourself whether you are granting this
person this order because another person
earlier that day was granted a similar order,
but the facts are completely different, and so
on. The scope of the Act is wide enough to
provide tailor-made protection orders to suit
the circumstances presented to you, but you
find yourself providing the same relief to
everyone…despite your better judgment.
There is little time to carefully examine these
applications and to grant orders that
specifically suit the situation. There are far
too few magistrates dealing with domestic
violence to give the Act its full effect. 
Concern was also expressed about the apparent
urgency of some applications. With high caseloads,
the courts are sometimes unable to grant interim
orders on the day that the application is made.
Although section 6 of the application form allows
the applicant to motivate “why the court should
consider the application as a matter of urgency” and
“why undue hardship may be suffered by the
applicant if the application is not dealt with
immediately”, this section seldom provides any
more information than what is already contained in
the affidavit. 
Although the contents of section 6 have on
occasion convincingly argued the case for an urgent
application, the general consensus among
magistrates was that there is rarely sufficient
information in this section to warrant an urgent
protection order. Applications are therefore
processed on a ‘first come, first serve’ basis meaning
that applications that cannot be reviewed on the
same day are postponed to the following day(s).
In light of this, it was suggested that the courts,
individually or collectively, develop a set of criteria
for what constitutes “urgency” and “undue
hardship”. This would enable clerks of the court to
prioritise cases that required urgent intervention and
ensure that applicants are sufficiently protected. It
was emphasised that these criteria do not have to be
inclusive, but instead consist of a ‘guiding’ set of
circumstances that would warrant urgency. As with
other issues debated, precisely what constitutes
“imminent harm”, “undue hardship” and “urgency”
remained controversial. The only real consensus
among magistrates about what constitutes “urgency”
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and “imminent harm” in domestic violence cases
includes situations in which:
• the respondent is in the possession of a firearm 
and has threatened to use the firearm against
the applicant, or her dependents or other family
members;
• the respondent has used a weapon against the 
applicant in previous incidences of domestic
violence (not restricted to firearms or knives);
• the applicant was critically injured by the 
respondent on a previous occasion, or on the
occasion in question;
• the applicant and her children have been 
‘kicked out’ of the shared residence by the
respondent or anyone affiliated with the
respondent;
• the applicant has sufficient evidence (i.e. 
witness statements) that the respondent has
threatened to harm her/him;
• the applicant fears for the safety of her children.
Clearly, these criteria do not sufficiently address the
perceived risk of applicants of further and imminent
harm. They also exclude a wide range of behaviours
that may be threatening to the safety, health and
wellbeing of the applicant and his/her dependents,
such as stalking, harassment and economic abuse.
The emphasis on physical abuse is worrisome and
defeats the object of ensuring full protection against
all forms of domestic violence set out in the
definition of the Act. 
Reading the affidavit
Great discrepancies were found between the
various sections of the application for a protection
order filled out by the complainant.3 The description
of the abuses set out in the affidavit often did not
correspond to the information completed in the rest
of the form. An attempt was made to compare the
affidavit with requests for cessation of abuses in
section (7)(a) or (h) of Form 2 (Terms of the
Protection Order in the application form), and the
orders granted by the magistrate (Table 1).
The following discrepancies were found between
the affidavits and the application orders:
• Although physical abuse was mentioned in 415 
affidavits, orders against physical violence were
requested in 54% of cases.
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• Only 17% of application forms mentioning 
sexual abuse requested protection from this.
• Only 11% of application forms mentioning 
economic abuse requested protection from this.
• 55% of application forms mentioning 
intimidation requested protection from this.
• Only 32% of application forms mentioning 
property damage requested protection from
further damage.
It is evident that there is a great deal of variance
between how victims experience abuse (as per the
affidavit) and how the clerks of the court tend to
‘systemise’ or narrowly categorise the abuse. The
results also illustrate how magistrates, in some
instances, grant particular conditions to applicants
for more comprehensive protection, despite what
was applied for in the application form. This is
particularly true for cases of physical abuse,
harassment and stalking. 
Magistrates reported that reading the affidavit against
the application form was essential and constituted
the basis for the decision to grant a protection order.
It was also reported that any indication of physical
violence and/or the threat of physical violence (often
referred to as “intimidation”) in the affidavit resulted
in an unequivocal decision to grant the applicant
protection from further physical violence. This was
the case regardless of whether section 7(a) or 7(h)4 of
the application forms were specific about physical
violence or not.
Table 1: Comparison of abuses noted in the affidavit, with the number of requests made and orders granted, 
in each category of abuse across magisterial districts
Type of abuse Court A Court B Court C
noted n=170 n=279 n=160   
Affidavit Request Order Affidavit Request Order Affidavit Request Order
for order granted for order granted for order granted
Physical 111 47 151 184 159 236 120 18 146  
Sexual 20 2 0 19 3 7 7 3 0  
Emotional/
verbal/
psychological 137 90 111 251 240 244 132 87 20  
Economic 45 10 15 92 3 18 35 7 2  
Intimidation 81 76 160 92 22 10 9 3 127  
Harassment 21 57 73 15 7 0 6 3 1  
Stalking 11 19 43 7 4 1 4 5 1  
Damage to 
property 45 22 24 42 4 24 33 12 11  
Entry without 
consent 9 11 4 9 1 3 13 1 1  
Other 63 * 19 121 * 5 10 * 0  
* Data was not collected regarding the number of requests made for behaviour that would fall into the 
category of ‘other’.
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Beyond physical violence
Less convincing for magistrates were applications
involving sexual violence, economic abuse and
psychological/emotional abuse. Magistrates
presented numerous scenarios that revealed a strong
scepticism  – or perhaps cautiousness – about these
three forms of domestic violence. The scenarios
were wide-ranging and represented both the
complexity of presiding over these matters as well
as pervasive myths, preconceptions and deep biases
about domestic violence and the ‘intentions of
women’ in applying for protection orders. 
Each case brings a new set of circumstances and a
new set of facts and should be treated with the
appropriate, individual attention. Of particular
concern are the following notions about domestic
violence that may impede appropriate justice for
applicants seeking protection:
• Some women apply for protection orders 
because they are angry about their husband’s or
partner’s infidelity. Protection orders should
therefore not be issued when there is evidence
of extra-marital relationships or when the couple
has separated due to an extra-marital
relationship.
• Women often apply for emergency monetary 
relief because they were unsuccessful in getting
maintenance from their partners.
• Sexual violence is not common in marriage or 
long-term domestic relationships.
• Some women apply to have their husbands/
partners removed from the shared residence so
that their new boyfriends can stay with them.
• Some women apply for protection orders 
against ‘emotional abuse’, but they are in no
real danger of being harmed.
• Some women use the ‘excuse’ of being 
concerned about the safety of their children to
get a protection order. However, it is really their
partners they are trying to punish for something
they did to them. 
• Some applicants (both men and women) use the 
Domestic Violence Act to further their own
cause in divorce or custody proceedings.
While it is true that relationships between people
are complex, and that ‘third parties’ and financial
matters create antagonism in domestic relationships,
magistrates need to seriously consider the
possibility that the breakdown or dissolution of the
relationship may put the applicant at risk of harm. 
While some applicants may abuse the DVA – as
much as people abuse the services of the police,
the ambulance service, the fire department, 10111
call centres and the courts, more generally – the
default position that assumes that applicants are
‘getting back’ at their partners, are not ‘abused
enough’, are equally abusive or are in ‘no real
danger’ when physical abuse is not present, is a
weak premise from which to make decisions. What
appear to be minor domestic conflicts or abuses
can easily escalate over a short period of time.
Emotional abuse is quickly translated into serious
physical and sexual violence and therefore should
be considered as serious as physical violence when
granting protection orders.
It was also found that court personnel become de-
sensitised to matters of inter-personal violence,
particularly non-physical abuses experienced by
complainants. It was suggested that in order to
circumvent “personal biases” by the magistracy,
magistrates should base their decisions on intensive
interrogation of the facts presented to the court.5 In
order for the Act to work effectively, the decision to
grant a protection order, or specific conditions
thereof, must be based on the assumption that the
applicant’s reason for applying for an order are
bona fide until proved otherwise.
The impact of police work 
Magistrates were careful to point out that they are,
to some extent, victims of the “domino effect”: their
decisions are dependant on how well the other
agents of the criminal justice system manage an
incident of domestic violence and document
investigations. When police and witness statements
are poor, missing or even illegible, the case against
an accused/respondent is weakened. 
While acknowledging that it is up to magistrates to
discern the relevance of the papers presented to the
court and to further interrogate the matter until a
reasonable decision can be made, magistrates
reported that the quality of these papers is often
very unsatisfactory. The extent to which magistrates
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saw themselves as being effective was greatly
dependent on the previous interventions and
interactions with these ‘frontline’ workers.
The magistrates were, however, very sympathetic to
the ‘triage-type’ working conditions and demands
placed on clerks of the court. They argued that if
the police took better statements from
complainants, clerks could spend more time
providing applicants with detailed information
about the relevant criminal and civil procedures. It
was recommended that when an incident of
domestic violence is reported to the police, the
statement taking should include these five essential
questions:
• the history of the abuse;
• a description of the most recent incidence of 
domestic violence;
• any medical attention sought by the
complainant as a result of the current incident
or previous incidents or any other evidence to
show that an act of domestic violence has taken
place;
• the complainant’s knowledge of any previous 
criminal records of the accused;
• the complainant’s knowledge of any orders 
against the accused (protection orders, interdicts
under the Prevention of Family Violence Act,
1993, maintenance orders, eviction orders, and
so on).
It was suggested that these questions would assist
the court in providing a more informed and
comprehensive service to the applicant.
Acknowledging that transforming police responses
to domestic violence cases was a long term
prospect and that over-burdened clerks often find
little time to fully explain the range of legal
remedies to applicants, it was recommended by
some that magistrates themselves play a greater role
in advising both applicants and respondents at the
Return Date. The idea that magistrates take on this
‘additional clerk’s duty’ however, became a
contentious issue. It was argued that:
By advising the applicant of her [or his]
rights, the magistrate becomes a ‘legal
advisor’ and therefore becomes impartial.
The magistrate is in no position to be a legal
advisor. There are other people to advise the
applicant on her rights under the Act.
A magistrate cannot be impartial if he is
acting as an investigating officer…and has
given legal advice to the applicant…
especially when the respondent has not
been heard at this stage.
A more moderated position about the role of
magistrates in explaining the remedies available
under the Domestic Violence Act was:
It must be clear…that the magistrate is not
giving legal advice. It must be stressed that
the magistrate is simply re-iterating the legal
options set out in the Act and reinforcing the
information that the clerk of the court or the
court volunteer has given to the applicant.
The final recommendation by magistrates was that
magistrates should inform both the applicant and
the respondent about the remedies available under
the Act as well as other legal options such as
applying for maintenance, custody, evictions or
divorce, and still retain the role of impartial
observer to the proceedings. Although it was
pointed out that section 2 and 4 of the Act, as well
as Regulation 3 and 5 of the Act, provide that the
clerk of the court should undertake this role, it was
largely agreed that informing the applicant and
respondent of their rights, remedies and obligations
under the Act, “could do no harm”. It was argued
that a magistrate could explain the legal options
available under the Domestic Violence Act, or any
other relevant Act to the applicant, without
necessarily advising the applicant on which options
she/he should take.
Counter protection orders
Counter protection orders – orders that are applied
for by a respondent against a complainant – were
cited as an increasing problem for magistrates. The
current system of file management does not allow
for accurate tracking of counter protection orders. 
Respondents rarely voluntarily submit information
of orders issued against them when applying for an
order against someone else, and court clerks do not
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have the capacity to cross-reference applications for
counter orders. However, magistrates and clerks do
identify applications for counter protection orders,
simply by remembering, by name or by sight, the
original applicant or respondent. The magistrates
estimated that between 5%–30% of applications are
counter protection orders and that this was on the
increase: 
You see more and more of these things. One
party gets an order then the other party gets
another order to retaliate. It’s not that
uncommon, but the courts are quickly
wising up to it. It is very difficult to track if
you don’t have good record-keeping systems
at the court and the second applicant is very
hesitant to say that the reason he is applying
for a protection order is because his wife got
one against him. My tolerance for these
cases is limited. It wastes the courts time and
it undermines the real purpose for the DVA.
These people need to learn to play these
games outside of my court.
Although counter protection orders may be
necessary in some cases, the granting of such orders
should be done with caution. In order to limit
vexatious claims against the original applicant and
to avoid granting conflicting orders between the two
parties, it was recommended that:
• the court establishes whether the applicant is 
aware of any other orders against the respondent
(including maintenance orders, protection
orders);
• the court establishes whether the applicant has 
any orders against him/herself (including
maintenance orders, protection orders);
• the court establishes whether any High Court 
orders are in place (such as custody orders);
• when existing orders are in place, the courts 
ensure that those orders are entered into the
court file and that any new orders issued do not
contradict the existing orders. It may, however,
be the case that an urgent application is
required to provide the new applicant with
temporary relief from domestic violence. In this
case, the court should consider providing such
relief until the original order can be varied or
amended. 
Conclusion
Despite the impression that magistrates have a
tendency to adjudicate domestic violence matters
conservatively, both the empirical research from the
First Report6 and this recent study with magistrates
have illustrated that most magistrates take a ‘better
safe, than sorry’ approach in granting particular
conditions in protection orders. The general
sentiment of magistrates is that it makes more sense
to have an all-inclusive protection order, than one
that will be subject to variation at a later stage. Still,
decisions regarding emergency monetary relief,
removal of the respondent from the shared
residence and contact orders with children are
reportedly treated with much more caution than the
other remedies available under the Act. 
Local court monitoring initiatives are therefore
essential in ensuring that the DVA is implemented
in a way that ensures both procedural consistency
and legal uniformity. Local data on magisterial
interpretation of the Act is essential to improve
overall decision-making. To ensure that the DVA is
implemented equitably, 45 magistrates have
contributed to the development of guidelines for the
implementation of the DVA. It is hoped that these
guidelines will be Gazetted in the near future and
assist magistrates in more effective decision-
making.7
Endnotes
1 Parts of this article were originally published in L Artz, 
Magistrates and the Domestic Violence Act: Issues of
Interpretation, Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law,
University of Cape Town, 2003.
2 This study was conducted to investigate the various 
approaches by magistrates in implementing the Act.
Broadly, the study involved the re-examination of our
monitoring database on the DVA (see P Parenzee, L Artz
& K Moult, Monitoring the Domestic Violence Act: First
Report, Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law,
University of Cape Town, 2001); in-depth interviews with
magistrates from each of the nine provinces; the analysis
of the outcomes of two major conferences (including
over 350 magistrates and High Court judges, facilitated
by this author and her associates); as well as the
outcomes of monthly meetings with the Domestic
Violence Working Group (a group consisting of
magistrates representing each province, the Justice
Training College, the Gender Directorate of the
Department of Justice and the author).
3 P Parenzee, et al, ibid.
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4 S. 7 contains the Terms of the Protection Order.
5 This may be done with the applicant and the respondent, 
on the Return Date. The regulations of the Act do provide,
in a notice to the applicant, that if the applicant
knowingly gives false information when applying for a
protection order or when laying a criminal charge, the
applicant may be prosecuted.  
6 P Parenzee, et al, op cit.
7 See L Artz, op cit.
